No new cases tomorrow

May 12, 2021 Leave a comment

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.

No new cases Monday

May 7, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases Monday.

No new cases tomorrow

May 5, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.

Judicial misconduct requires reversal of the death verdict but not the guilt verdict

May 4, 2021 Comments off

Judicial misconduct requires reversal of the death verdict but not the guilt verdict

People v. Nieves

www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S092410.PDF

S092410

A jury convicted Sandi Dawn Nieves of the first degree
murder of her daughters Nikolet Amber Nieves, Rashel Hollie
Nieves, Kristl Dawn Folden, and Jaqlene Marie Folden (Pen.
Code, § 187),
1 attempted murder of her son, F.D. (§§ 664, 187),
and arson (§ 451, subd. (b)). The jury found true the special
circumstance allegations that defendant committed multiple
murders, and that each murder was committed while lying in
wait and while engaged in the crime of arson. (§ 190.2, subds.
(a)(3), (a)(15), (a)(17).) Following the penalty phase of trial, the
jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion to modify the death penalty verdict and her
motion for a new trial (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and sentenced her to
death. This appeal is automatic.
We affirm Nieves’s convictions but reverse her death
sentence due to the trial court’s misconduct.

A reasonable probability a defendant was misadvised about immigration consequences justifies relief

May 4, 2021 Comments off

A reasonable probability a defendant was misadvised about immigration consequences justifies relief

People v. Vivar

www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S260270.PDF

S260270


In 2018, Vivar filed a motion to vacate his 2002 conviction
under a recently enacted statute offering relief to those who had
already served their sentences. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7 (section
1473.7).) A successful section 1473.7 motion requires a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, of a prejudicial error that
affected the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand the
actual or potential immigration consequences of a plea. (Id.,
subds. (a)(1), (e)(1).) The Court of Appeal concluded that while
counsel had failed to offer Vivar competent advice about
immigration consequences in 2002, Vivar failed to demonstrate
any prejudice from the error. (People v. Vivar (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 216, 225–231 (Vivar).) Based on an independent
review of the record, we disagree. Vivar has demonstrated a
reasonable probability that if he had been properly advised by
counsel about the immigration consequences of his plea, he
wouldn’t have pleaded guilty to an offense subjecting him to
mandatory deportation. We therefore reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeal.

Death penalty affirmed

April 30, 2021 Comments off

Thursday the Cal. Supremes affirmed another death penalty case.

People v. Steskal
S122611

Coming tomorrow

April 28, 2021 Comments off

Coming tomorrow from the Cal. Supremes:

PEOPLE v. STESKAL (MAURICE GERALD)
S122611 (Orange County Superior Court – 99ZF0023)
Argued in San Francisco 2-02-21
This matter is an automatic appeal from a judgment of death.

No new cases Monday

April 23, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases Monday.

No new cases tomorrow

April 21, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.

Juvenile temporary restraining orders require notice

April 19, 2021 Comments off

Juvenile temporary restraining orders require notice

In re E.F.

S260829

When a minor is the subject of a juvenile wardship petition, the juvenile court may, “upon application in the manner provided by Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” issue ex parte orders enjoining the minor from “contacting, threatening, stalking, or disturbing the peace of any person the court finds to be at risk from the conduct of the child, or with whom association would be detrimental to the child.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (b); all undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)  The Courts of Appeal have divided on whether the juvenile court may issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) pursuant to this statute without advance notice to the minor.

We hold that section 213.5, subdivision (b) incorporates the notice requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (c).  By the terms of that provision, “[n]o temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (c)) to the minor unless the prosecutor (1) shows that “great or irreparable injury will result” before the matter can be heard with proper notice (id., subd. (c)(1)) and (2) previously informed the minor of the time and place that the application will be made, made a good faith attempt but was unable to so inform the minor, or provides specific reasons why the prosecutor should not be required to so inform the minor (id., subd. (c)(2)).  Where the prosecutor has not given advance notice and has not made an adequate showing to justify the lack of notice, the court must give sufficient time for counsel and the minor to prepare and respond to the application before any order is issued.

Coming Monday

April 16, 2021 Comments off

Coming Monday from the Cal. Supremes:

IN RE E.F.
S260839 (B295755; B297079; Los County Superior Court – PJ53161)
Argued in San Francisco 2-02-21
The court limited review to the following issue: When the prosecution moves
for a temporary restraining order in a juvenile wardship proceeding without having
given advance notice to the minor, must it be shown that: (a) “great or irreparable
injury will result” before the matter could be heard with proper notice, and (b) the
prosecution notified the minor within a reasonable time prior to the hearing regarding
when and where the order would be sought, or attempted the notify the minor, or for
specified reasons should not have been required to notify the minor? (See Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (b); Code of Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (c).)

No new cases tomorrow

April 14, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow.

Death penalty affirmed

April 12, 2021 Comments off

Coming Monday

April 9, 2021 Comments off

Coming Monday from the Cal. Supremes:

PEOPLE v. WILSON (BYRON)

S087533 (Los Angeles County Superior Court – BA164899)

Argued in San Francisco 12-01-20

            This matter is an automatic appeal from a judgment of death.

No new cases tomorrow

April 7, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow.

No new criminal cases Monday

April 2, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases Monday.

No new criminal cases tomorrow

March 31, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases tomorrow.

No new criminal cases Monday

March 26, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases Monday.

“The common practice of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional.”

March 26, 2021 Comments off

“The common practice of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional.”

In re Humphrey

S247278

An arrestee’s release pending trial is often conditioned on whether the arrestee can make bail.  To do so, an arrestee posts security — in the form of cash, property, or (more often) a commercial bail bond which is forfeited if the arrestee later fails to appear in court.  Those who can’t afford to satisfy the bail condition remain in jail until the end of the criminal proceedings. 

Underlying this arrangement is a major premise:  that the state has a compelling interest in assuring the arrestee’s appearance at trial and protecting the safety of the victim as well as the public.  Yet those incarcerated pending trial — who have not yet been convicted of a charged crime — unquestionably suffer a “direct ‘grievous loss’ ” of freedom in addition to other potential injuries.  (Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 435 (Van Atta).)  In principle, then, pretrial detention should be reserved for those who otherwise cannot be relied upon to make court appearances or who pose a risk to public or victim safety.  (Cf. Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 661–662 (Bearden)[limiting the circumstances in which an indigent probationer may be incarcerated for failure to pay a fine or restitution]; In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100, 113–116 (Antazo)[same].)  But it’s a different story in practice:  Whether an accused person is detained pending trial often does not depend on a careful, individualized determination of the need to protect public safety, but merely — as one judge observes — on the accused’s ability to post the sum provided in a county’s uniform bail schedule.  (See Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety (2008) 13 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 16–17.) 

  Petitioner Kenneth Humphrey, joined by the Attorney General, challenges this system with a claim as simple as it is urgent:  No person should lose the right to liberty simply because that person can’t afford to post bail.  His claim joins a “clear and growing movement” that is reexamining the use of money bail as a means of pretrial detention.  (ODonnell v. Harris County (S.D.Tex. 2017) 251 F.Supp.3d 1052, 1084.)

We find merit in Humphrey’s claim.  The common practice of conditioning freedom solely on whether an arrestee can afford bail is unconstitutional.  Other conditions of release — such as electronic monitoring, regular check-ins with a pretrial case manager, community housing or shelter, and drug and alcohol treatment — can in many cases protect public and victim safety as well as assure the arrestee’s appearance at trial.  What we hold is that where a financial condition is nonetheless necessary, the court must consider the arrestee’s ability to pay the stated amount of bail — and may not effectively detain the arrestee “solely because” the arrestee “lacked the resources” to post bail.  (Bearden, supra, 461 U.S. at pp. 667, 668.) 

In unusual circumstances, the need to protect community safety may conflict with the arrestee’s fundamental right to pretrial liberty — a right that also generally protects an arrestee from being subject to a monetary condition of release the arrestee can’t satisfy — to such an extent that no option other than refusing pretrial release can reasonably vindicate the state’s compelling interests.  In order to detain an arrestee under those circumstances, a court must first find by clear and convincing evidence that no condition short of detention could suffice and then ensure the detention otherwise complies with statutory and constitutional requirements.  (See post, pp. 21–23.) 

Detention in these narrow circumstances doesn’t depend on the arrestee’s financial condition.  Rather, it depends on the insufficiency of less restrictive conditions to vindicate compelling government interests:  the safety of the victim and the public more generally or the integrity of the criminal proceedings.   Allowing the government to detain an arrestee without such procedural protections would violate state and federal principles of equal protection and due process that must be honored in practice, not just in principle. Because the trial court here failed to consider Humphrey’s ability to afford $350,000 bail (and, if he could not, whether less restrictive alternatives could have protected public and victim safety or assured his appearance in court), we agree with the Court of Appeal:  Humphrey was entitled to a new bail hearing

Coming tomorrow

March 24, 2021 Comments off

Coming tomorrow from the Cal. Supremes

IN RE HUMPHREY (KENNETH) ON HABEAS CORPUS
S247278 (A152056; San Francisco City and County Superior Court – 17007715)
Argued in San Francisco 1-05-21
The court limited review to the following issues: (1) Did the Court of Appeal
err in holding that principles of constitutional due process and equal protection require
consideration of a criminal defendant’s ability to pay in setting or reviewing the
amount of monetary bail? (2) In setting the amount of monetary bail, may a trial
court consider public and victim safety? Must it do so? (3) Under what circumstances
does the California Constitution permit bail to be denied in noncapital cases?
Included is the question of what constitutional provision governs the denial of bail in
noncapital cases — article I, section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c), or article I, section
28, subdivision (f)(3), of the California Constitution — or, in the alternative, whether
these provisions may be reconciled.

No new criminal cases tomorrow

March 17, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases tomorrow, Thursday.

No new cases Monday

March 12, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases Monday

No new cases tomorrow

March 10, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.

No new cases Monday

March 5, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases Monday.

No new cases tomorrow

March 3, 2021 Comments off

The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow.