Mental Health Diversion Must Occur Pre-trial
Mental health diversion must occur pre-trial
for defendants with qualifying mental disorders. Here we
consider the latest point in the criminal proceedings at which a
defendant may request such diversion. We conclude that, in
keeping with the statutory language and overall scheme, the
request must be made before attachment of jeopardy at trial or
the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first.
Coming Monday
Coming Monday from the Cal. Supremes:
PEOPLE v. BRADEN (CORY JUAN, Jr.)
S268925 (E073204; San Bernardino County Superior Court – FV118001116)
Argued in San Francisco 3-08-23
The court limited review to the following issue: What is the latest point at which a
defendant may request mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36?
No new criminal cases today
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases today.
CHANGE IN LAW GOVERNING GANG CRIMES APPLIES RETROACTIVELY
CHANGE IN LAW GOVERNING GANG CRIMES APPLIES RETROACTIVELY
Defendant Robert Cooper was convicted of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(e)), and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–
(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). We granted review in this case to
determine whether any of Cooper’s sentencing enhancements
must be vacated due to this recent statutory change to section
186.22.
3
The parties as well as the Court of Appeal below all
agree that Cooper’s jury was instructed under the prior law, that
the new requirements in section 186.22 apply retroactively to
Cooper’s case on appeal under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, and that the prejudice from the instructional error is
assessed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
(Chapman). (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207
[the rule of Estrada applies to Assem. Bill 333’s changes to §
186.22 and any instructional error resulting from the change in
law is assessed under Chapman].) Applying the Chapman
standard, we hold that the failure to instruct that the alleged
predicate offenses must have “commonly benefited” the gang in
a “more than reputational” manner (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1)) was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the record
contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding
regarding whether the gang as a whole (as opposed to the
predicate offenders themselves) benefited from the offenses in a
nonreputational manner. We reverse Cooper’s gang
enhancement, as well as the firearm enhancement that is
contingent upon the gang enhancement, and remand the case to
the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the
superior court for any retrial of the same.
MANDATORY CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR SEX CRIMES DOES NOT REQUIRE A JURY FINDING
MANDATORY CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR SEX CRIMES DOES NOT REQUIRE A JURY FINDING
The question here is whether section 667.6(d), in requiring
that a sentencing court impose “full, separate, and consecutive
term[s]” for certain sex crimes if it finds certain facts, complies
with the Sixth Amendment. We hold that it does: the rule of
Apprendi and Alleyne does not apply to section 667.6(d) under
the rationale of Ice.
Coming today at 10 a.m.
Coming today at 10 a.m. from the Cal. Supremes
PEOPLE v. COOPER (ROBERT)
S273134 (B304490; Los Angeles County Superior Court – TA140718)
Argued in San Francisco 3-08-23
The court limited review to the following issue: Must any of defendant’s sentencing
enhancements be vacated due to recent statutory changes requiring that the offenses
necessary to establish a “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ . . . commonly benefited a
criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offense is more than reputational”
(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (e)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3)?
PEOPLE v. CATARINO (EDGAR SANDOVAL)
S271828 (D078832; Santa Clara County Superior Court – C1635441)
Argued in San Francisco 4-04-23
The court limited review to the following issue: Does Penal Code section 667.6,
subdivision (d), which requires that a “full, separate, and consecutive term” must be
imposed for certain offenses if the sentencing court finds that the crimes “involve[d] the
same victim on s
No new criminal cases Monday
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new criminal cases Monday.
No new cases tomorrow
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.
Failure of the juvenile court to declare a wobbler is a felony or a misdemeanor requires reversal
Failure of the juvenile court to declare a wobbler is a felony or a misdemeanor requires reversal
In this case, the trial court did not comply with section
702’s express declaration mandate. That point is undisputed.
The question is whether the Court of Appeal erred in declining
to remand the matter to the juvenile court. We hold that it did.
A section 702 error requires remand unless the record as a whole
demonstrates that the juvenile court “was aware of, and
exercised its discretion” as to wobblers. (Manzy W., supra, 14
Cal.4th at p. 1209.) Because the record here does not
demonstrate such awareness, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
No new criminal cases today
The Cal. Supremes issued no new criminal cases today.
No new cases tomorrow
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.
No new cases tomorrow
The Cal. Supremes will issue no new cases tomorrow, Thursday.
JURY’S FINDING FAILS TO ESTABLISH MALICE
Jury’s finding fails to establish malice
Jury instructions erroneously permitted the second degree
murder conviction of petitioner Tyree Ferrell based on a felonymurder theory invalidated by People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1172 (Chun). The jury’s unadorned guilty verdict does not show
it avoided this now-invalid theory. The Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation nevertheless
argues the instructional error was harmless and asks us to
uphold Ferrell’s conviction. The Secretary argues the jury’s
additional finding — that Ferrell intentionally discharged a
firearm and caused death in committing his offense (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) — along with the evidence adduced at
trial, show that any rational jury would have found Ferrell
guilty under a valid theory of second degree murder, implied
malice.
We conclude that, whether viewed in isolation or in light
of the entire record, the jury’s additional finding fails to
establish the mental component of implied malice, which
requires a defendant to act with a conscious disregard for life,
knowing his act endangers another’s life. The jury could have,
consistent with its additional finding, concluded Ferrell shot
Lawrence Rawlings, his childhood friend, while trying to stop a
fight without believing he was shooting towards any person.
This scenario would not demand a finding of implied malice. We
therefore cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury
properly instructed without the erroneous felony-murder
Coming tomorrow
Coming tomorrow from the Cal. Supremes
FERRELL (TYREE) ON HABEAS CORPUS
S265798
Argued in San Francisco 1-06-23
In this case, the court issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted
on the ground that the jury’s true finding on a Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement did not render People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 error harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
THE GANG-MURDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE CAN’T SHOW CHUI ERROR, STANDING ALONE IS HARMLESS
THE GANG-MURDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE CAN’T SHOW CHUI ERROR, STANDING ALONE IS HARMLESS
The Court of Appeal was therefore incorrect to hold that
the gang-murder special circumstance, standing alone, showed
that the Chiu error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
And, while “overwhelming” evidence may demonstrate
harmlessness, a court’s analysis of whether the evidence is
“overwhelming” in this context is not as subjective or freeranging as that term might imply. Instead, the analysis
requires a court to rigorously review the evidence to determine
whether any rational juror who found the defendant guilty
based on an invalid theory, and made the factual findings
reflected in the jury’s verdict, would necessarily have found the
defendant guilty based on a valid theory as well. (Aledamat,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 15.) Based on its short discussion, the
Court of Appeal does not appear to have fully appreciated the
proper standard for harmlessness in this context. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for
reconsideration in light of the standards we describe in this
opinion
Coming today
Coming today from the Cal. Supremes
LOPEZ (RICO RICARDO) ON HABEAS CORPUS
S258912 (A152748; Sonoma County Superior Court – SCR32760)
Argued in San Francisco 1-06-23
This case presents the following issues: (1) Does a true finding on a gang-killing
special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) render Chiu error (People v. Chiu
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155) harmless? (2) To what extent or in what manner, if any, may a
reviewing court consider the evidence in favor of a legally valid theory in assessing
whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the valid
theory, when the record contains indications that the jury considered the invalid theory?
(See People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1.)
BRADY DUTY APPLIES POST CONVICTION
Brady duty applies post conviction
We conclude that the Attorney General has both a
constitutional and an ethical duty to disclose evidence in
response to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady
violation under certain specified circumstances. In addition, we
conclude that the respondent to such a petition has a duty to
disclose evidence forming the basis of the Brady claim under
circumstances that we describe. We explain how these duties
may be performed when, as in this case, the evidence forming
the basis of the Brady claim in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus is subject to statutory disclosure restrictions. Finally, we
apply these conclusions in Jenkins’s case and reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
D.A. continuance must be granted if denial would result in dismissal
D.A. continuance must be granted if denial would result in dismissal
This case involves a motion to continue the hearing on a
suppression motion. (§ 1538.5.) We conclude the Ferguson
principles apply when the People are unable to proceed with
such a hearing. If the challenged evidence is so critical that its
suppression would require dismissal of the case, the court must
generally grant a continuance unless dismissal would be in
furtherance of justice. The burden is on the prosecution to show
an inability to go forward without the evidence in dispute. The
court, however, must ultimately determine whether dismissal of
the case is reasonably probable absent a continuance.
California Supreme Court Criminal Law Blog 